The 90s: Seinfeld, The Yankees, and an Army in Peacetime

By Dan Sukman and Aaron Bazin

It has been said that there is nothing worse than being in a peacetime Army.  We suggest that there is one thing worse, being in an Army that cannot fight.  The United States Army faces an uncertain future. As it comes out of a decade plus of persistent conflict, it is clear that the Army faces stark choices in force structure and culture.  Already we are witnessing the drastic reduction in the number of personnel, to include removing civil affairs units from active duty and reinstituting selection boards for schooling to discriminate early to separate the “haves” from the “have nots.” Today, at a point where the U.S. Army is arguably the best it has ever been, there is a concern that it has begun its peacetime backslide. If you spent time in the Army of the 90s, it should scare the hell out of you too. If you came into the service following 9/11, here is a small glimpse.

A Zero Defects Mentality:  The Army of the 1990s had a zero defect mentality where the relief of a commander for missing a screwdriver in a motor pool inventory was the norm.  A culture where commanders and senior NCOs are judged on random arms room inspections and performance in field training exercises serve as an ultimate a mark of success or failure is runs counter to the adaptations we pushed since 2001. Sadly, with the reduction in the size of the force accompanied by a reduction in promotion rates it is the small minute, often irrelevant differences that will separate individuals appearing before a board. An Army that adapts a zero defects culture is one filled with leaders who are unable to accept and take risk.

Polished boots and starched uniforms:  There is a systematic belief that polishing boots instills much needed discipline into the ranks. Naturally, polished boots and starched uniforms will lead to better allocation of personal finances, as family budgets will take into account higher dry-cleaning bills and the $10 per week to have the guy at the PX spit shine their boots. However, starched and polished uniforms do not translate to battlefield success.  There is a danger that the Army will revert to a culture where it will not matter how smart you are, how high your PT score may be, or your proficiency with small arms, that fact that you have sleeve tattoos will get you thrown out of the Army. When appearance is valued above competence, the best and brightest quickly leave the service to find work in other places.

Early Performance as Measure of Success:  The Army should never rely on how leaders perform as a Platoon Leader or as a Battalion S1/S4 to determine who will command and lead at the higher levels. In this type of Army, scripted gunnery tables are the preeminent measure of tactical acumen. Often the success of a platoon leader or company commander can be a matter of the right platoon sergeant or operations and first sergeant, while leaders at the operational and strategic levels are often late bloomers in terms of success and maturity.

No Sunglasses but Camo Face Paint:  The Army must continually adapt and embrace common sense additions to the uniform. The Sergeant Major of the Army’s recent decision to allow earbuds with the PT uniform is a step in the right direction. It took a 15-year war in the deserts of Iraq and Afghanistan to change the culture on sunglasses and camelbacks. However, the Army must guard against a culture where face paint made of hard wax from the Korea-era will be re-issued to each soldier to apply every day in the field, and that this standard will hold for rear-echelon troops the same as it would for LRRS detachments and other Special Forces units operating deep in the enemy rear. 

Badge Chasing: The Army is in a bad place when officers and NCOs are judged according to the number of and type of schools they have attended, even if they are irrelevant to their current duty position. With a decline in the number of soldiers serving in combat, the badges or tabs on a uniform may be more coveted than time in a leadership position.   

Branch Insignia: Similar to a culture of badge chasing, the Army must avoid a return to a culture where one immediately assess the amount of respect to pay an officer based on what is attached to their uniform. We should fear a culture where judgments of leaders will not be based on their physical, mental, and problem solving skills, but rather their branch assigned to them as a West Point or ROTC cadet.

War Stories: As the number of troops engaged in combat operations has dwindled, a culture develops where combat experience is secondary to training events. There will be a day when war stories of Afghanistan and Iraq are replaced with stories from CTC Rotations, Ranger School, or other professional development courses. Moreover, rotations at the training centers such as NTC and JRTC will not be considered training, but rather the ultimate test in the worthiness of a unit, where the T in NTC and JRTC stands for testing in lieu of training.  This leads to an era where failure to defeat the OPFOR at NTC may result in a relief of command in the same way that a flat head screwdriver found missing during an inventory will. 

Limited Resources: An army that can barely afford to train its men and women for combat will lose the first battle of the next war. In an era of limited funding, soldiers will train with limited resources leading range time once a year where a soldier is issued 12 rounds to zero and 40 rounds to qualify.  This type of culture moves away from advanced rifle marksmanship and forces leaders to develop unrealistic training objectives with minimal resources. Limited resources tend to reduce the philosophy of mission command, leading to a return to the era where no soldier is allowed to load a magazine in their M4 without the strict supervision of a range safety. 

Yellow PT Belt: The reflective belt culture is not a creation of the Army of the 90s. Some may credit the reflective belt for solving the age-old military problem of not being able to immediately identify soldiers in the hours of limited visibility. Even today, as the Army created a PT Jacket with a reflective belt sewn into it, an additional belt is often worn on top. We should fear an Army that can’t get past this absurdity.  

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The views expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not reflect the official policy or position of the U.S. Army, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government

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Daniel Sukman is a strategist in the U.S. Army, a former Military Fellow at the Project for International Peace & Security (PIPS), and a member of the Military Writers Guild. Over the course of his career, Dan Sukman served with the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault), United States European Command, and the Army Capabilities Integration Center (ARCIC). His combat experience includes multiple combat tours in Iraq and Afghanistan

Aaron Bazin is career Army officer with over 20 years of leadership and management experience operating at the highest levels of the Department of Defense (DoD), the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), U.S. Central Command, and within the institutional Army. Operational experience includes deployments to Pakistan, Afghanistan, Qatar, Iraq, United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Jordan, and Kuwait. He is the author of the book, Think: Tools to Build Your Mind. 

The Enduring Interest Test

By Aaron Bazin

            In the military, we are taught that when we start to plan by conducting a mission analysis of our order from “higher.” From this mission analysis, we are taught to derive our mission, intent, and concept. At the tactical level, this works pretty well and serves to ensure that plans are nested within a larger approach.  However, as one works their way up from the tactical to the strategic level, guidance from higher gets increasingly broad and conceptual. 

At this level, it is common for military planners to become frustrated that political guidance is fuzzy, dynamic, or plain absent.  They also may find it very challenging to develop a campaign plan that synchronizes military activities in time, space, and purpose.  In these cases, the military planner may search tirelessly for the higher guidance they need in various strategic documents, only to realize they are dealing with a situation that is unique or moving so fast that there is no real guidance to be had.  In these circumstances, enduring interests can provide strategic thinkers a valid way to come up with political-military objectives when even the policymakers themselves may be uncertain as to what to do.

Why Enduring Interests?

            When trying to ascertain what should be done in any novel policy situation there are a variety of valid approaches.  One could look at past decisions and apply them to new circumstances, but at the risk of choosing the wrong lesson of history.  One could look deeply into the ideology of those in power, but risk a reversal when the political winds of change direction.  There is one conceptual anchor that one can rely on in novel situations and weather the storm of policy change; enduring interests.

            Thucydides himself identified that fear, honor, and interest where three of the primary driving factors in the decisions nations make.  Also, the idea of enduring interests plays a prominent role in contemporary U.S. national security documents. If we assume that enduring interests are of fundamental importance, then we can use them to help lay the conceptual foundation of our strategic thinking.  Enduring interests have almost an immutable power because they can persist throughout changes of administration, changes in policy, and changes in threats.

The Constitution and America’s Enduring Interests

Enduring interests are one of the most powerful forms of communicating a long-term vision because of their source, the founding documents of a nation.  In the case of the United States, the U.S. Constitution provides critical insights to the enduring interests of the nation:

“We the People of the United States, in Order to form a more perfect Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defence, promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of America.”

 The preamble contains some powerful language that arguably describes the enduring interests of the nation.  First, it discusses values, including the continued striving for perfection in unity, establishing justice, and securing liberty.  Second, it outlines the importance of security in the form of common defense and internal tranquility.  It also alludes to prosperity as an enduring interest when it discusses the general welfare and the blessings of liberty.  Arguably, the U.S. Constitution is the contract between the government and the people and, as such, a source of legitimacy.  If we combine these major areas together, values, security, and prosperity as a source of legitimacy, arguably we can generalize the following simplistic model:

One Model of Enduring U.S. Interests

An Enduring Interest Test

            To test for the suitability of a military activity, one should be able to tie it to one or more of these interests, let us call this the enduring interest test.  To conduct a brief thought experiment to illustrate how this could work, let us say that we are charged with developing political-military objectives for the 1990-1991 Gulf War.  To craft hypothetical objectives that pass the test, all we have to do is to connect clear connect operational objectives to one of the three categories of security, prosperity, and values, perhaps like this:

·         Defeat Iraqi forces in order to improve security in the region.

·         Maintain the free flow of economic commerce in the region to set the conditions for continued global prosperity.

·         Secure the internationally recognized territory of Kuwait to restore its freedom as sovereign nation.

            By tying operational actions to statements to items of enduring interest we can gain numerous benefits.  First, this sets forth clear logic between our military activities and political outcomes.  Second, the statements provide a clear and obtainable desired state that the military can use to see if it has accomplished what it has set out to.  Finally, it ensures these desired outcomes are congruent with the timeless ideas the nation was founded upon, thereby fostering legitimacy with both internal and external audiences. As complex adaptive systems, strategic problems continually change.  As such, military planners will always have to continually assess and adjust political-military objectives accordingly as circumstances change.

Conclusion

            Of course, this is not really that new of an idea.  As discussed, Thucydides was one of the first strategic thinkers to identify the importance of interests and many have adapted and applied this ideas since then.  In no way does this diminish the fundamental importance of the concept.  The bottom line is that when a nation uses the military instrument of national power it should clearly delineate just how it will further the enduring interests of the nation.

            In describing Stoic Roman philosophy, Marcus Aurelius advised to “Be like the promontory against which the waves continually break, but it stands firm and tames the fury of the water around it.”  If you think about it, perhaps we should view enduring interests in this same way.  Ultimately, basing strategic thinking and military planning on the fundamental ideas expressed in the Constitution gives our strategic thinking more gravitas and provides military forces a clearer picture of the target they are aiming for.   

Iraq A Photo Essay

I start with a picture that defines my worldview. This picture was taken at a small outpost on the Euphrates River south of Baghdad. As the sun set, I was struck the beauty of the river and the sun. Everything of beauty can have a semblance of ugliness. Warfare can bring out the best and the very worst in people. The rolls of concertina wire fit into the latter category. 

Like the sunset on the Euphrates River, Kadamiyah in West Baghdad had its moments of beauty. Offsetting the palm trees was an AH-64 Apache Helicopter providing air support.

When I would fly over parts of Iraq, the helicopter would often fly over the Victory Base Complex. This was a series of palaces once occupied by Saddam Hussein and his inner circle. The senior leadership of U.S. forces would use these palaces as headquarters for commanders and staffs. 

Despite the gaudiness of Saddam's palaces, Iraqi citizens lived in some awful conditions. Not quite the slums of India, but trash piles seemed to be everywhere. You never appreciate garbage collection run by local government until you live where that concept doesn't seem to exist. 

On my 2005-2006 deployment, we lived in tents for for about 7 months, and moved into Containerized Housing Units (CHUs) for the last five months. We even had concrete barriers for protection against indirect fire. Laundry was contracted out, so we had clean linen, which is paramount in preventing disease. The Iraqi Army lived in "barracks" like these. 

They lived in shitty conditions, and drove around in trucks like this. As their counterparts we had Up-Armored HMMWVs.  

We were lucky, our vehicles could withstand some hits from IEDs a little better than jury rigged pick-up trucks

A bridge in South Baghdad over the Euphrates River. The bridge was there long before Americans arrived. The concrete barriers were not. Again, beauty contrasted with ugliness. 

This was taken in Southern Iraq. There were many sides to Iraq, Sunni/Shia, Wealthy/Poor, Urban/Rural. A lone farmer with his flock walking about unconcerned with the broader war  at the time caused me to reflect on life's priorities at the time.

The Temple of Ur.  I was lucky enough to see this biblical site up close. We like to think war is a uniquely human endeavor. And we humans have been fighting wars for a long time.  I like to think that humans can one day end war, and I look at this picture and am reminded that I could not figure out how to set the date on my camera. So we have that going for us. 

I have been to scores of memorial ceremonies over the past 15 years. Most recently follwoing a suicide bomber attack on Bagram Airfield in Afghanistan. This photo was from my 2005/2006 deployment, where it felt like there was a ceremony every week. From Clausewitz to U.S. joint doctrine, we constantly try to define war. I think those of us who have been to war each leave with our own variance on the definition. To me, war is a place that brings out the best of us, and exposes the worst. War is the ultimate equalizer where men and women can succeed in anonymity or fail spectacularly. The results of success and failure is the differnece between a redeployment ceremony and a memorial cereony. 

Please, No More Pick-up Teams

By Aaron Bazin

Teamwork is a hallmark of the military.  From your first day in uniform until your last, you are part of a team.  In many ways, no one does teamwork better than the military.  It is part of our culture, our ethos, it is part of who we are deep in our DNA.  Building, training, and employing teams in difficult and dangerous situations is what leaders in the military do.  Arguably, few professions do it better.

            What is troublesome is once the mission is accomplished, more often than not, the team dissolves.  Even if teams are stabilized for combat operations, everyone scatters to the four winds at the end of a tour. If team members do end up in the same unit later in their careers, it is probably due to some rare twist of fate rather than a deliberate decision.  At times, it seems a bit counter-intuitive that an organization that prides itself on being a team of teams should break up the best teams are trained and performing at their peak.  This is especially surprising when it comes to the difficult task of strategic thinking, contingency planning, or policy development.

Is There a Better Way?

            In their 2013 Harvard Business Review Article, “The Hidden Benefits of Keeping Teams Intact,” Huckman and Staats tell the story of one of the best knee surgeons in the world.  Where other surgeons do a typical knee surgery in one to two hours, he averages 20 minutes.  Where other surgeons do around 220 knee surgeries a year, he does 550.  He also has fewer complications and has pioneered a number of new surgical techniques.  How does he do it?

The key variable is that he has worked with the same two teams for over 18 years.  In this circumstance, team familiarity, or the amount of experience individuals have working with one another, provides an undeniable advantage.  This is not an isolated phenomena.  Huckman and Staats go on to describe a study of over 11,000 workers that indicated, “when familiarity increased by 50%, defects decreased by 19%, and deviations from budget decreased by 30%.”  At the strategic-level of decision making, perhaps keeping a team together longer may be a good idea.

Keeping a Core Team Together

            When faced with a complex geo-strategic problem or devastating crisis, it stands to reason that the military would want a team that is the best that it can possibly be.  It seems logical not that you would not want people to have to progress through the often-rocky stages of forming, storming, norming, and performing at the same time. The Army has experimented with cohort units before.  Maybe it is time to try again at the staff level?

If you were a general charged with making a tough decision or recommendation, just maybe you would like a team that knows how you think and knows what your definition of right looks like?  Imagine for a moment that you are promoted to general and get your first assignment.  As a part of your transition, you travel to Leavenworth to pick up your core team, a group of staff officers selected explicitly for compatibility with your personality and trained together as a cohort at the staff college.  You have a chance to discuss with them how you like to work, your philosophy, and expectations.  This cohort staff stays with you for the remainder of your time in the military.  If you are lucky enough to reach the 4-Star level, you now have a team that you have built over a decade that knows you probably better than you know yourself.  The team stays together so the highest performing generals, and the highest performing teams, rise together to the top. 

Conclusion

            Many generals already personally manage individuals that fill key roles, so this idea is not completely new.  However, doing this in a more deliberate fashion at scale with teams across the force could provide an advantage.  It could be difficult, but it is not impossible.  Of course, this idea would need a way for involving experts, inducting new people, and require a healthy dose of red teaming to avoid in-group bias and groupthink.  At the end of the day, the advantage is that the best teams have a special quality that good individuals thrown together for a pick-up game have a hard time matching.  Who knows, keeping a good staff team together longer could unlock untapped potential and help make high-performance teams the norm, not the exception?

The Big Ethical Questions

General Martin E. Dempsey, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, teaches a class on ethics to midshipmen during his visit to the U.S. Naval Academy, 2014.

By Aaron Bazin

Looking at how strategy and ethics intersect is not an easy task. There are many ways to look at both subjects, and one could spend a lifetime reading and reflecting upon all the finer points. Every person has their own way of looking at the issue of ethics, but ultimately each strategic thinker must responsibly apply ethics address the challenge at hand.     

There are many questions a strategic thinker routinely asks, but the ethical questions are not often enumerated. To come up with some of the major ethical questions strategic thinkers should ask themselves, their teams, and those they advise, we must begin somewhere. We can justifiably assume that the typical strategic thinker is focused on identifying the morally correct course of action for practical application in the real world, or applied ethics. If we can assert that this is the case, the basic first-order question that all strategic thinkers continually wrestle with is this:

What should we do?

There are a wide-array of ethical lenses we can use to practically address this question. Fieser (2015) has described many of the ethical models philosophers ponder. If we combine our first-order question with these models, we can distill sub-questions that the strategic thinker can use to apply the major ethical models in a practical way. These questions are as follows:

▪      According to the precepts of eternal and immutable law, what should we do? (objectivism)

▪      According to what we individually think is right and wrong, what should we do? (individual relativism)

▪      What does our culture suggest that should we do? (cultural relativism)

▪      What is best for us? (egoism)

▪      What is best to display benevolence to others? (altruism)

▪      What do we feel is right emotionally? (emotive)

▪      What is right not taking into account emotion at all? (rationalism)

▪      What is our duty? (male-modeled morality)

▪      How should we act caringly in this situation? (female-modeled morality)

▪      What should we do based on what we would want done to us? (normative)

▪      Based on the traits that we wish to live by, what is proper? (virtue)

▪      What should we do to maintain a balance in our actions and avoid extremes? (golden mean)

▪      What is our duty to a higher power? What is our duty to ourselves? What is our duty to others? (Pufendorf’s duties)

▪      How can we uphold the rights of others? (moral rights)

▪      What action would treat others with dignity? (categorical imperative)

▪      Are the consequences of action more favorable than unfavorable? (consequentiality)

▪      What should we do based on rules and laws? (social-contract)

▪      What action would best benefit society? (social benefit)

▪      What action would assist others who cannot otherwise assist themselves? (paternalism)

▪      What action would prevent or reduce harm to others? (principle of harm)

▪      What action would acknowledge individual freedom? (principle of autonomy)

▪      What is fair to do? (principle of justice)

Obviously, these questions are very general in nature. If the strategic thinker is to make any use of them at all, they must go deeper. As the contextual nuances of each strategic problem differ, one should carefully consider the specific parameters at play in each case. To this, the strategic thinker must also add what they know, what they believe, and yes, even what they feel.

Asking and answering these questions is not easy, nor should it be. Strategic problems are typically complex and adaptive troublesome in and of themselves. Looking at strategy through an ethical lens can add to this complexity, but is absolutely vital. Arguably, if we fail to use some sort of ethical compass to guide our strategic thinking, then we have already lost our way.

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Aaron Bazin is career Army officer with over 20 years of leadership and management experience operating at the highest levels of the Department of Defense (DoD), the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), U.S. Central Command, and within the institutional Army. Operational experience includes deployments to Pakistan, Afghanistan, Qatar, Iraq, United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Jordan, and Kuwait. This post is an adapted portion of his new book, Think: Tools to Build Your Mind. 

The GOFO Championship Belt

In my last essay, I wrote about what makes a flag officer successful.  Looking back to 1776, we can determine the GOFO MVP year by year. As some GOFOs hold the title for multiple years, I think it is worthwhile to have a GOFO Championship Belt. 

Comparing figures from different eras is a difficult task. For example, comparisons of LeBron James to Michael Jordan or Larry Bird do not hold up. Advancements in sports science and medicine over the decades have created athletes that would crush the competition of decades past. The worst team in the NFL this season would easily defeat any Steelers team of the 1970s, or even the 1985 Bears (think about the 250 pound linemen of the 70s compared to 330 pound linemen of today). In a similar manner, trying to determine the greatest general or admiral in U.S. history is a daunting task. Each faced unique circumstances of war to include different enemies, different levels of domestic support, and varying levels of preparedness of the nation.

Sports writers such as Bill Simmons and Bill Barnwell recently developed a championship belt for the reigning champions in areas such as “America’s Greatest Athlete,” and “America’s Best Comedian.” In line with this thought, we can go through America’s history of generals and admirals to name the best one for each year. This construct would begin in 1776, with the formation of the United States, and run into 2016.

A couple simple ground rules.

1. The holder of the belt must be either a general or admiral from any of the services, to include the coast guard. If an officer does not have stars on his or her uniform, they are not eligible, with the exception of the rank of Commodore in the 1800s (the rank of admiral was not created until 1866). Sorry Colonel John Warden.

2. Second, the selected officer must be an American officer. Lafayette, Rochambeau, and others who served the United States in a role outside of the U.S. military are not eligible; this includes generals who served the Confederacy. 

3. A general’s or admiral’s actions after they have the belt have no impact on the year they hold the title. For example, Stan McCrystal’s firing has no impact on his time as the SOF commander in Iraq.

The criteria to earn the title belt for best general/admiral each year is entirely subjective, but includes the following:

A.      Winning on the battlefield.

B.      Contributions to U.S. grand strategy

C.      Development of strategic thought.

D.      Historic accomplishments

4. Finally, this list is meant for fun, entertainment, and to generate discussion. I welcome agreements and disagreements.

So here we go...

1776 - George Washington (USA): Long Island, White Plains, and of course the crossing of the Delaware to defeat the Hessians at the Battle of Trenton, where Washington began the tradition of killing our enemies on Christmas, at night.  Washington also help professionalize the military and deftly used espionage and military deception to his advantage.

1777 - Horatio Gates (USA): One of the three leading generals in the Battle of Saratoga, the turning point in the American Revolution. Honorable mention to Benedict Arnold and Daniel Morgan

1778-1779 - George Washington (USA): Back to GW who led the Americans at the Battle of Monmouth.

1780 - Nathaniel Greene (USA): Having been appointed commander of the South, where he was able to avoid direct engagements and harass British troops until the Americans were ready for decisive battle.

1781 - George Washington (USA): GW becomes a three-time champion earing full credit for the Battle of Yorktown. Honorable mention to Nathaniel Greene for his actions at Guilford Courthouse and Eutow Springs.

1782-1793:  The title is vacant during the early years of the Republic. As the United States tried to cope with how to view a standing Army, and how to employ military force. Further, nothing would highlight the failures of the Articles of Confederation as the military debacle of Shay's Rebellion.

1794 – George Washington: Washington is the only sitting President to earn the title. He does so in 1794 for his actions in suppressing the Whisky Rebellion.

1794: Honorable Mention:– Anthony Wayne (USA)  This revolutionary War hero led American Forces to victory in the Battle of Fallen Timbers. This victory sealed the fate of the British in the Northwest Territory.

1801-1805 - Commodore Edward Preble (USN): The commander of U.S. Naval forces throughout the conflict with the Barbary States.

1805-1810: Vacant: Although the U.S. Army was engaged in opening the frontier with the likes of Zebulon Pike and the Lewis and Clarke expedition, no General or Admiral stands out during this timeframe.

1811: William Henry Harrison (USA): In 1811, a future President earns the title for his leadership in Battle of Tippecanoe.  He would also earn a the nickname “Tippecanoe”

1812: Vacant: Initial phases of the War of 1812 didn’t go so well.  

1813: Oliver Hazard Perry (USN): brilliant success in the Battle of Lake Erie in September 1813 placed the Northwest Territory firmly under American control.

1814-1815 - Andrew Jackson (USA):  A future president earns the title for taking Pensacola and his subsequent role in the battle of New Orleans, despite the battle occurring after the signing of the Treaty of Ghent.

1816-1843, Winfield Scott (USA): Scott is promoted to Brigadier General in 1814. Throughout his reign, Scott would lead American Troops in the Mexican American War where he landed at Veracruz. During peacetime, Scott would have a vital role in the nullification crisis of 1832/1833, serving as President Jackson’s emissary to South Carolina.

1844-1845 - Zach Taylor (USA): Taylor interrupts Scott’s run with his actions throughout the Mexican American War.

1846 – Commodore John D. Sloat (USN): For his conduct during the Mexican American War as the commander of naval forces in the Pacific.  It was Sloat who seized Monterey

1847-1852 – Winfield Scott (USA): General Scott begins his second run in 1847 by leading the first major amphibious landing in U.S. history in preparation for the Siege of Veracruz. He would then move his forces into Mexico City and establish himself as a national hero.

1852-1854 – Matthew C. Perry (USN): Commodore Perry makes the list with his expedition and opening of trade with Japan.

1854 – 1860- Winfield Scott (USA): Scott culminates his championship run with the development of the Anaconda Plan, which was far ahead of its time in thinking about military campaigns.

Winfield Scott

1861 – Vacant…Bad year for the Union….and Confederates are not eligible

1862 -1863 - U.S. Grant (USA): Grant’s breakout began with Fort Donaldson and Shiloh and culminated with the Battle of Vicksburg.

1864 - William T. Sherman (USA): Sherman edges out Grant with the conceptualization of total war in his famous March to the Sea.

1865: Back to Grant (USA): Although his success as a president is often questioned, his prowess as great campaigner led to the defeat of the south in the Peninsula Campaign.

1866-1876 – Phillip Sheridan (USA): Efficient in his role throughout the reconstruction era. Further, Sheridan would act as an early conservationist and was instrumental in preserving and saving Yellowstone National Park for future generations to enjoy.

1877 -1883-: William Tecumseh Sherman (USA):  During these years, General Sherman established the Army’s Command and General Staff School (now CGSC).

1885-1890 –Alfred Thayer Mahan (USN): It was in this time that Mahan published his seminal work The Influence of Seapower upon History 1160-1783. His book and subsequent lectures would influence navies across the globe.

1891-1895: John Schofield (USA): no general or admiral distinguished themselves during this time, but General Schofield served as Commanding General of the U.S. Army due to his date of rank following the death of General Sheridan.  

1896-1897: Vacant:  Little happening as the U.S. began preparing for war with Spain.

1898 - Admiral Dewey (USN) – The admiral earns the title due to his leadership and victory at the Battle of Manila Bay.

1899 - Arthur MacArthur (USA) – The father of 5-Star General Douglas MacArthur led the 2nd Division of Eighth Corps during the Philippine–American War at the Battle of Manila (1899), the Malolos campaign and the Northern Offensive.

1900-1902 – Leonard Wood (USA): Leonard Wood, whose namesake carries on as home of the Military Police, Chemical, and Engineer schools holds the title for three years while serving as Military Governor of Cuba.

1910 – 1912 – Leonard Wood (USA) As the only medical officer to serve as the Army Chief of Staff, Leonard Wood implemented  he forerunner of the Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) program, and the Preparedness Movement, a campaign for universal military training and wartime conscription.

1913-1918 – John J. “Blackjack” Pershing (USA): Beginning with the Battle of Bud Bagsak during the Moro Rebellion phase of the Philippine–American War, continuing into the expedition to Mexico in pursuit of Pancho Villa, Pershing would then serve as Commander of the American Expeditionary Forces in the First World War. It was Pershing who ensured American soldiers were not thrust into battle to quickly, nor assimilated into the European armies. The parallel command structure was paramount to allied success. Following the war, Pershing assumed his role as Army Chief of Staff.

1919-1920 – Smedley Butler (USMC): The two-time Medal of Honor recipient transformed Quantico VA from a temporary training base to a full time / permanent Marine post. 

1921-1924 – Fox Conner (USA): The man who made Eisenhower. Over these three years, Conner imparted the wisdom upon the future Supreme Allied Commander and President of the United States.

1924-1925 - Billy Mitchell (USA/USAF): Viewed as the father of the Air Force, was court-martialed for accusing the leadership of the Army and Navy of, “treasonable administration of the national defense.” Mitchell’s title begins and ends with his demotion to Colonel following the Court Marshal.

1926-1927 – Mason Patrick (USA/USAF): Cleaned up the mess of Billy Mitchell’s court martial, and subsequently became the first Chief of the Army Air Corps.

1928-1933 – William A. Moffett (USN) Rear Admiral Moffett served as the Navy Bureau of Aeronautics chief. Moffett was the first high-ranking naval officers to appreciate the importance of the airplane and the effect it would have on the fleet.

1933 – 1935: Vacant: During this time of the interwar period, no flag officer distinguished themselves to earn the title.

1936-1937 – Leon Kromer (USA): As Chief of Cavalry, general Kromer advocated for mechanization of the Cavalry. Unfortunately, his replacement, general Herr, did not share that sentiment.

1938 – Hugh H. Drum (USA):  During this time, the American military was smaller than most European nations, to include Germany, Spain, and even Portugal. General Drum, (yes, of Fort Drum fame) was the commander of First Army during this time, and developed the staff in preparation for the Louisiana Maneuvers in the following years.  

1939-1941 - George C. Marshall (USA): Not only did Marshall prepare the United States Army for the upcoming war with limited resources, he carefully selected those who would assume the highest levels of military command throughout the war.

1940 Honorable Mention: Benjamin O. Davis (USA) The first African American to achieve Flag Officer Rank

1942 - Chester Nimitz (USN): Taking command 10 days after Pearl Harbor, Nimitz’s ability to wage the largest naval campaign in history is unquestioned. 1942 was the year of Midway, the turning point of the war in the Pacific.

1943 – Ernest Harmon (USA): One of the shining stars of the North Africa Campaign as the commander of 2nd Armored Division. Also a graduate of Norwich University

1944-1945 - Dwight Eisenhower (USA): It was in the last two years of the Second World War that Eisenhower truly shined. Eisenhower was able to hold together a fragile coalition and manage the personalities of high profile figures such as Patton and Montgomery.

1946-1947 – Omar Bradly (USA): Serving as the first post war Army Chief of Staff, he would later be selected to serve as the first Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in 1949.

1948-1949 – Curtis LeMay (USAF): The Berlin Airlift was nothing short of a miracle, and one of the early successes against communist aggression.

1950: O.P. Smith (USA): extraordinary leadership (both in planning and in execution, with an extra star handling screwed up superior officers) at Chosin.

1951-1953 - Matthew Ridgeway (USA): Leader of 8th Army in Korea, and appointed UN Commander after the relief of MacArthur. Lessor known, Ridgeway also took over as the military governor of Japan. During his tenure, Ridgway oversaw the restoration of Japan’s independence and sovereignty

1954-1964: Admiral Hyman Rickover (USN) and Bernard Adolph Schriever (USAF) Rickover is the father of the Nuclear Navy. The launch of USS Nautilus in 1954 gives the USN an advantage in nuclear propulsion, especially in submarines, that it has not relinquished. At the same time Rickover was leading the way in nuclear propulsion, Schriever, in direct contrast to Curtis LeMay while leading Air Research Development Command was responsible for creating the intercontinental ballistic missile.

1965-1966 – Victor H. Krulack (USMC): During this time Krulack was the Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific. Krulack developed the “Spreading Ikblot Theory” of small unit actions in direct contrast to Westmorland’s victory through overwhelming firepower concept. Victor Krulack is also the father of General Charles C. Krulak, the 31st Commandant of the Marine Corps.

1967 –J.C. Wylie (USN): This obscure admiral earns the title for publishing Military Strategy, A Theory of Power Control.

1968-1969 – Frederick C. Weyand (USA): A dissenter on the policies and strategy of General Westmoreland, General Weyand even took on John Paul Vann as an advisor despite higher up misgivings.

1970 – Elizabeth Hoisington and Anna Mae Hays (USA): The first two women promoted to achieve the rank of flag officer in the United States.

1971 – 1972 – Lucius Clay (USAF): General Clay served as the commander of 7th Air Force and U.S. Air Forces Pacific during these tumultuous years of Vietnam.

1973 – Alexander Haig (USA):  Still retaining his active duty commission, General Haig served as President Nixon’s Chief of Staff during the Watergate scandal, and is often credited with keeping the White House running while Nixon was pre-occupied with lying to the American public.

1974 - Creighton W. Abrams (USA): As Army Chief of Staff, Abrams began to rebuild the U.S. Army. In 1974 Abrams began the transition to the all-volunteer Army, also known as Project VOLAR.

1975-1977 – William DePuy (USA): As the first commander of the Army’s Training and Doctrine Command, DePuy was an innovator who led the development of AirLand Battle Concept and Doctrine

1978-1981 – Donn Starry (USA): Continued the efforts of William DePuy for the development of AirLand Battle as Commander of TRADOC

1982-1983 - Huba Wass de Czege (USA): The obscure 1-Star earns the title for the development and implementation of the School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS)

1984-1988 – C. Everett Koop MD.  The Surgeon General of the United States is still a general, and in fact wears an admiral’s uniform. Koop earns the title for his relentless anti-smoking campaign, and for acknowledging the AIDS epidemic.

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Dr. C. Everett Coop

1989-1990 - Colin Powell (USA): Held the position as the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff through the invasion of Panama and Operation Desert Storm.  Even though he oversaw military activities in 28 different crises, he rarely advocated military intervention as the first solution.

1991 - Norman Schwarzkopf (USA): As an steely-eyed barrel chested freedom fighter, he was the commander of Joint Forces in the 100-hour Operation Desert Storm. As the CENTCOM Commander, Stormin Norman dual hatted himself as the Land Component Commander for Operation Desert Storm.

1992 - Colin Powell (USA): Takes the title back from Stormin’ Norman at the conclusion of the Desert Strom. Powell would oversee the transition in the military from 12 years of a Republican as Commander in Chief to the Clinton administration.

1993 - George Joulwan (USA) As the Supreme Allied Commander, General Joulwan oversaw initial U.S. and NATO actions in Bosnia.

1994 – Hugh Shelton (USA): Then a mere Lieutenant General, the future Chairman earns the title as Commander of 18th Airborne Corps, and its planning and execution of Operation Uphold Democracy

1995 - John Shalikashvili (USA): The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff who aggressively pushed the Clinton Administration for an air campaign to defend Bosnia from Serbian onslaught.

1996 – Leighton Smith (USN): Admiral Smith was the commander of the NATO Implementation Force (IFOR) in 1995 and 1996. In this capacity, Admiral Smith was the focus of criticism for not expanding the role of IFOR to include the detention of Serb War Criminals. But in taking a minimalist approach, Admiral Smith may have avoided bogging down U.S. forces into a long quagmire.

1997 – 1998 – Anthony Zinni (USMC): USCENTCOM was quickly becoming the only show in town as operations in the Balkans seemed to slow down. These years Zinni earns the title for the first time for his leadership during contingencies such as Operation Desert Fox.

1999 - Wes Clark (USA): Clark earns the nod for his leadership throughout the Balkan Wars in Bosnia and Kosovo. Keeping NATO unity while balancing military necessities with the wishes of civilian leadership in the United States and Allied Nations.

2000 – Anthony Zinni (USMC): When the leader of a coup of a nation that possesses nuclear weapons (Pakistan) calls the CENTCOM commander before the President, that gets you the title.

2001-2002 – Tommy Franks (USA): The Commander of USCENTCOM during the initial stages of the War in Afghanistan.

2003 – 2004 - David McKiernan (USA): The Coalition Forces Land Component Commander for the invasion of Iraq. Although the war would turn into a disaster, under McKiernan’s leadership, land forces raced from Kuwait to Baghdad in three weeks. 

2005 – Russel Honore’ (USA): The Ragin Cajun earns the title in 2005 for his role as the commander of Joint Task Force Katrina. Honore’ even coined the phrase “stuck on stupid” which is now a staple of media commentary.

2006 – Stan McCrystal (USA): The year JSOC killsAbu Musab al-Zarqawi, leader of Al-Qaeda in Iraq.

2007- David Petraeus (USA): General Petraeus earns the title with the implementation of the surge in Iraq, combined with his leadership and implementation of the COIN doctrine he developed while commanding at the Army’s Combined Arms Center.

2008 – Ann Dunwoody (USA) General Dunwoody earns her place on the list when she became the first female 4-Star general. As a 4-Star she would be responsible for the logistics of an Army fighting two wars with nearly half the force deployed in Iraq and Afghanistan.

2009 - Raymond T. Odierno (USA): As the Commander of Multi-National Forces Iraq (MNFI), the future Army Chief of Staff was responsible for maintaining the gains of General Petraeus’ Surge.

2010 – Thad Allen (USCG): The only Coast Guard admiral on the list. Allen was the face of the U.S. government response to the Deepwater Horizon oil spill in the gulf while acting as the National Incident Commander.

2011-2013- James Mattis (USMC): Arguably the best-read general on the list, proved to Iraqis that there was no better friend and no worse enemy that a U.S. Marine. His time as the USCENTCOM commander is legendary.

2013 – Martin Dempsey (USA): A Chairman who spoke truth to power. Dempsey is the best singer to hold the title of best general.

2014 – 2015 H.R. McMaster (USA): Provided a clear vision of the Army with the publication of the Army Operating Concept. McMaster is a visionary who even made the Time Magazine list of 100 most influential people.

Disclaimer: The author worked at the Army Capabilities Integration Center (ARCIC) during this time, the same time LTG McMaster served as the ARCIC director.

2016 – Lori Robinson (USAF): First female Combatant Commander. Further, General Robbins is a non-pilot GO to operate at every level, including deputy CFACC at AFCENT in '13-14, and then Commander of Air Forces Pacific prior to command at USNORTHCOM.

2017 - H.R. McMaster (USA): After losing the title for a year, McMaster retakes the helm for leading the effort and producing the 2017 National Security Strategy. As an active duty 3-star general, McMaster was in a tough position as the National Security Adviser, yet was able to coordinate one of the better National Security trategies of the past two decades.

2018 - Vince Brooks (USA): 2018 was a tumultuous year on the Korean Peninsula. Tensions rose, then subsided between the United States and North Korea. Talks between heads of state occurred for the first time. South Korea hosted the Winter Olympics. Finally, there was an uptick in the repatriation of remains of fallen U.S. Soliders from the Korean War. The one constant throughout the year was the leadership of General Brooks, the Commander of U.S. Forces Korea (USFK), Combined Forces Command (CFC), and United Nations Command (UNC). Wearing these three hats is never simple, and General Brooks absolutely crushed it.

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the U.S. Army, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government

Judging GOFOs

Americans like to rank things. From Dave Letterman’s nightly Top 10 list, to college football’s weekly rankings, America is fascinated with rankings. Listen to talk radio on the way to work, and you may hear an argument on whether Tom Brady or Joe Montana is the greatest quarterback of all time. Nearly every year a list of the greatest presidents will appear. Political partisans are quick to point out how a current President is either the best or the worst president in history, through many of these arguments seem devoid of any historical context.

Only recently have those in the defense and military complex begun to look at how we rate generals. Tom Ricks, on his “Best Defense” blog has discussed the top 10 worst generals in U.S. history.[i] However, the list is subjective, and open to debate, as top 10 lists tend to be. As military professionals, we should think about more objective ways to rate generals and determine their relative success. To do so demands development of objective criteria.

Historical writings on general officers focus on key attributes such as leadership, ethics, or tactical and strategic competence.  The shortcoming in this analysis is the overwhelming number of general officers will not lead large masses of forces in combat. The large body of work of U.S. Army general officers occurs outside of command, and often at the institutional level. Judgment on the success or failure occurs in this framework.

Literature Review

Multiple authors over the past century tackled the complex issue of generalship. Writings span the range detailing success and failures of the military’s highest leaders. Books that discuss the subject include Rick Atkinson’s The Liberation Trilogy, which includes An Army at Dawn.  Further, there is H.R. McMaster’s Dereliction of Duty, Tom Rick’s The Generals, J.F.C. Fuller’s Generalship, and Karl Von Clausewitz, who discusses attributes of great generals in his seminal book On War.

The books discussed above center around two notions. First, success in combat. Second, the attributes required of military flag officers. H.R. McMaster’s seminal book Dereliction of Duty centers on the failures of the Joint Chiefs of Staff throughout the Vietnam War. Their respective failure occurred through a lack of intestinal fortitude to speak truth to power on events in Vietnam. As ineffective leaders, President Johnson ignored their weak advice on the use of military power. Although an excellent book on the details of strategic failure, a focus on the 4-Star leadership of the U.S. military ignores the overwhelming number of general officers at the 1-3 star level, often working institutional issues of manning, equipping, and training the force that fought in Vietnam.

J.F.C. Fuller wrote on the attributes or competencies required of general officers. Specifically, Fuller detailed how generals must consistently serve on the front line with their troops.[ii] Displays of physical courage, according to Fuller are essential to successful general officer leadership.

Both Tom Ricks and Rick Atkinson discuss in high detail the success and failures of general officers in Iraq and World War II respectively. For Ricks, the success of flag officers ultimately comes down to performance in combat. However, an important aspect of Rick’s work is the detailed discussions of General George Marshal. Not only was Marshal instrumental in his work to prepare and maintain an Army at War, his paramount contribution came in the selection of the Army’s combat leaders. Indeed, proper talent management of the general officer corps had as much to do with victory in World War II as did the operational planning and execution of field commanders.

Continuing with the attributes of flag officers, Karl Von Clause wiz, in his  book On War, describes the military genius required of those who hold the higher rank. Clausewitz describes the trait known as Coup d’ oeil as “an inward eye,” or the ability of commanders to instantly recognize, decide, and act on a situation in battle.[iii]  Further, Clausewitz informs his readers that generals should consistently refine their respective intellect, as in an environment defined by fog, friction, and chance, discriminating judgement is paramount.

Moral character

A display of high morals and ethics is the minimum standard for both the officer corps and the general officer corps. As the minimum, general officers should not be graded on their personal conduct. Proper morals and ethics is a pass/fail exam. Similar to the Chris Rock comedy routine, there are some things in life you don’t get credit for. General Officers (all officers really), do not receive credit for not being drunk on duty. Nor do general officers receive credit for not cheating on their spouses, or sleeping with subordinates. Further, general officers do not get credit for submitting accurate travel vouchers. The failings of General Sinclair and General Ward serve as a reminder, that improper conduct from the most senior military leaders leave a stain on the military as a

Other characteristics or desired qualities of general officers apply in how we expect the military’s most senior officers to serve still apply. J.F. C. Fuller wrote about the desire for general officers to talk to and serve with front-line soldiers. Further, physical and moral courage remain paramount in what we expect of general officers. Traits and characteristics however, fall short in the judgement on the effectiveness of generals and admirals in today’s complex world.

Long Lasting Impact

On the operation side, the judgement of generals often comes down to the outcome of the war. Indeed, General Officers of the WWII generation are often regarded as heroes, regardless of detailed analysis of their respective conduct. General officers of the Vietnam era re often grouped and labeled failures, despite the varying degrees of performance. However, not every general gets to command large organizations in combat. As such, their impact is observed within military institutions.

General officers should be leading the military in change. At the end of a career, general officers should examine their body of work both in the intellectual and physical aspects. Intellectually, general officers should be writing to publish and advance their ideas that they have developed over the course of a 25-40 year career. Publishing what one thinks, prior to retirement is paramount to inviting discussion, innovation, and change.

Physical change occurs in how well general officers physically change the Army. A profound example of success is Huba Wass de Czege’s implementation of the School of Advanced Military Studies at Fort Leavenworth. Indeed, the SAMS program has been paramount in building and sustaining the intellectual capacity of the Army for over a generation. Further, many credit the SAMS program for producing the “Jedi Knights” who created the operational plans for the first Gulf War.

Other examples of a long lasting policy impact upon the services includes those who developed AirLand Battle, and the implementation of the combat training centers. General officers who led the development and implementation of AirLand Battle such as William DePuy are an easy target to paint for success. Another example of a strategic thinker whose impact went well beyond his tenure of service is Admiral J.C. Wylie who conceptualized a theory of control. Juxtaposed against the success of these flag officers are those who advocated for the implementation of Effects Based Operations (EBO). Indeed, the development of long-lasting doctrine tested in battle is a high water mark of successful flag level officers.

The implementation of training facilities such as the National Training Center (NTC) at Fort Irwin and the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) ensured that the U.S. Army could rapidly adjust to combat conditions when the time came. Again, the development of JRTC and NTC proved to be decisive in the U.S. victory over the Iraqi Army in both the Gulf War and major combat operations in Iraq in 2003. Today, the Army uses the Decisive Action Training Environment (DATE) to prepare soldiers

Future Combat Systems (FCS) quickly earned the moniker Failed Combat Systems. For nearly a decade, the United States Army spent inordinate amounts of money on combat platforms and systems that would prove to be both irrelevant and unnecessary. Successful material solutions in recent history include big-ticket items such as Patriot Missiles and the M1 tank, both of which are part of the famed “Big 5.”  These and other modern day systems such as Blue force Tracker should be used as a marker for judging the success or failure of general officers.          

Civilian-Military Relationship

Two general officers, despite battlefield success are generally viewed upon as failures at the end of their respective careers. General MacArthur nearly destroyed the civilian-military relationship with his personal conduct during the Korean War. In a similar vain, General Stan McCrystal, for all his battlefield brilliance as the commander of JSOC, was relieved of command for violating the trust of our civilian masters. The ability for general officers to maintain the proper relationship between the military, the executive, and the legislative branches of government is paramount.

General Officers are often called to testify before congress to justify force structure and the acquisition of critical capabilities of the force. The capacity to justify and get congress on board with recommended force structure is paramount to the success of general officers. If the elected leaders of the United States do not believe what you are telling them, or impressing upon them to do, then a general’s tenure in office cannot be judged as a success. A recent example is General Odierno, who often went to congress with the intent of maintaining a 490k man active force, only to have QDRs, and NDAAs written for a smaller force structure reduced to 450.

The 20/20 hindsight consensus is General Eric Shinseki was correct when he testified to congress that the United States would need overwhelming numbers of troops in Iraq to secure the population following major combat operations (although the author remains unconvinced on this point). However, being right is not the equivalent of success. Success in this aspect would have been to convince Congress and the Secretary of Defense of the necessity of said combat forces. We should rate generals on the quality of the force after they retire.

Talent Management

General Marshall is the obvious example of a General Officer who identified and groomed talent leading up and through World War II. As directors on service and combatant command staffs, the onus is on general officers to ensure that field grade level talent is maximized throughout the officer corps. In the confines of each successive assignment. Ultimately, flag officers choose the next cohort of flag officers. The failure of generals and admirals either in combat or in their respective institutional performance is both a judgement on the individual officer, and those that selected the individual for senior leadership. Looking back Fox Conner’s greatest success was General Marshall, and in turn, one of his highest marks of success was General Eisenhower. We should rate generals based on the performance of their follow-on generation of general officers.

Mentoring the Next Generation  

General officers should continue to provide mentorship to those they rate and senior rate. This is paramount in the development and success of Field Grade Officers and the senior NCO Corps. However, individual counseling works best at the tactical level. At the operational and strategic level, general officers have the opportunity to provide a vision of the future force and share their wisdom through writing and publication.

More than personal mentorship, those holding flag officer rank need to write and publish their thoughts and ideas.  If the general officer corps is the PhD level of the military, subsequently, each officer wearing a star on their uniform should be contributing to the military filed of knowledge. This wisdom should be shared through commander’s blogs, publications in professional journals, and speaking engagements at various professional military education (PME) schools, to include Captains Courses, CGSC, ACSC and the various War Colleges. Further, our senior leadership should engage enlisted PME at every opportunity. We should rate generals on the body of thought they leave to future generations.

Conclusion

The success or failure of systems, policies, and influence is not a judgement on the totality of a career. Indeed, those that fail to implement a successful program can point to overarching achievements over two to four years, and in the case of flag officers twenty five years plus of dedicated service to the nation. Outside of moral and ethical failings, a judgement on the performance of the flag officer corps should in no way be viewed as a judgement on character.    

[i] Thomas Ricks. http://foreignpolicy.com/2010/06/02/the-worst-general-in-american-history-2/

[ii] J.F.C. Fuller Generalship; Its Diseases and Their Cure.

[iii] Karl Von Clausewitz. On War. 

Thoughts on Air Superiority

There are a few things Soldiers desire in combat. Hot chow, quality leadership, and looking up to the sky with confidence that the aircraft above are friendly. Indeed, not since the Korean War has an enemy aircraft launched a successful attack on American ground forces. Brigidear General Alex “Grynch” Grynkewich published a series describing the fight for air superiority in 2030, and the capabilities the Air Force requires to ensure the United States can achieve air superiority when and where it’s needed.

In terms of joint force contributions to air superiority. The Army will have a role to support the Air Force in the air superiority mission. Capabilities and platforms such as the next generation of Patriots and THAAD are essential to the defense of air bases that the Air Force launches from. As enemies and adversaries acquire longer-range fires, the ability to protect airfields from distanced adversaries will be necessary. Moreover, although air defense missile capabilities have a history of shooting down enemy missiles, they are still effective at destroying enemy aircraft.  

In addition to air defense platforms, the army can provide a combination of ISR through the use of special operations forces. Indeed, Special Forces cannot only identify enemy air defense targets for destruction; they can provide the Joint Force Air Component Command (JFACC) with accurate battle damage assessments. Moreover, Special Forces working with local populations and indigenous forces can influence a wide range of enemy platforms prior to the introduction of friendly aircraft into a Joint Operations Area (JOA).  The use of Special Forces does not occur in a bubble, they must accompany a wide range of options to defeat enemy and adversary A2AD threats.

Complementing the use of Special Forces are joint force information operations capabilities. These capabilities range from Military Information Support Operations (MISO) to public affairs to key leader engagements and can be critical for the suppression of enemy air defense systems. For example, in terms of MISO, the ability to message enemy ADA platform operators or enemy pilots prior to takeoff can reduce the risk to U.S. platforms. Should enemy pilots understand that take-off in their respective aircraft will translate to death; they tend to think twice before engaging. Indeed, examples are plentiful in both Iraq Wars of Iraqi Pilots flying aircraft to adjacent nations to avoid destruction by the U.S. and other coalition air forces. MISO, however is not the only Information Operations related capability that the joint force can leverage to attain air superiority.

A successful key leader engagement plan executed prior to and throughout a conflict is paramount to overcoming anti-access efforts by adversaries. While U.S. diplomats engage political leaders for access to other nation’s air bases and support facilities, Joint leaders must engage their counterparts to ensure a rapid execution. The ability to seamlessly flow aircraft into a newly opened airfield that is set for operations allows the joint force to gain and maintain the initiative in the air. Unnecessary delays

General Grynkewich effectively communicates the necessity of cyberspace. Each service provides capabilities to ensure success in the cyberspace domain. However, although the Air Force will certainly focus its efforts on the Air Superiority mission, both the Army and Air Force will be well served to develop multi-service  or joint concepts on how cyberspace operations will contribute to Air Superiority. Indeed, each service has a stake in the attainment of air superiority, and should contribute to the mission in the shared domains of space and cyberspace.

Where I think General Grynkewich’s analysis could use more development is in the development of human capital. His discussion on innovation in “how the Air Force has traditionally developed and fielded systems” can certainly apply to the entirety of the joint force. However, this consideration must move beyond material solutions in the DOTMLPF paradigm. Indeed, General Grynkewich’s articles describe the platforms necessary to attain air superiority and do mention the need to adjust tactics and training. However, all services must consider how we develop the people who will operate these platforms. These include pilots, programmers working in the cyberspace domain, analysts evaluating intelligence, and Special Forces operators, to name just a few. As enemies and adversaries continue to advance and disseminate near-peer technology, America’s asymmetric advantage and ability to achieve air superiority will be in the form of human capital.  

In addition to human capital, it is germane to discuss other joint force contributions to air superiority in the future. Further, attaining air superiority requires the investment of time and effort of non-military entities, specifically diplomacy to ensure friendly airplanes fly over the heads of America’s ground forces. General Grynkewich takes careful time to discuss third-offset material capabilities; however, when the joint force considers how to attain air superiority in contingencies, interaction with civilians in the department of state is paramount. Since the end of World War II, the United States has developed a global presence with land, air, and maritime capabilities spread across the globe. Should conflict occur, use of these bases to launch aircraft (strike, ISR, Air to Air Refueling) is paramount. Indeed, Air Superiority will depend on the whole of government to overcome the anti-access fight through sustained engagement in peacetime, and in the build-up to conflicts.

Successful diplomacy to achieve air superiority is also necessary in the battle for legitimacy of U.S. operations. Enemies and adversaries will take their arguments to organizations such as the United Nations to delay or prevent the deployment and employment of U.S. power (to include air, maritime, and land forces). These delays can allow enemies to achieve a marked advantage by reducing the U.S. militaries initiative. Further, successful action through international organizations can prevent the U.S. from using select basing options necessary to attain air superiority.

The "D" in Elements of National Power

Air superiority is not America’s birthright. Enemies and adversaries will continue to seek symmetric and asymmetric advantages to overcome American power projection. Near peer adversaries will continue to develop aircraft and ADA platforms that can engage America’s latest generation of fighter aircraft. Moreover, nations will move in parallel on diplomatic fronts to ensure the United States cannot attain access to friendly or partner nation facilities during times of conflict. The Department of Defense and all services must look at their respective capabilities and determine how they will contribute to the air superiority mission.   

By the Numb3rs

Over time Westmoreland asked for and received large numbers of U.S. troops, eventually totaling well over half a million…  

…Westmoreland’s first resort in claiming progress in the war was always body count, but in fact this was meaningless. All the enemy’s losses were quickly made up. Westmoreland was on a treadmill. 

Lewis Sorely

                Over the course of a military career, nothing will take up more time than counting. Counting people and counting things starts from a private’s first day in service and continues to the final day of a 4-star general’s career. This obsession with counting and numbers occurs in operational and institutional commands. Failing to count properly can end a promising career. To explain this obsession with number, I break down the many (although not all) ways in which those in a uniform count

Keeping an accurate count starts early in a career at the individual level. For example, knowing your pace count is essential to pass land navigation courses. Unfortunately, land navigation tends to occur in rough and dense terrain, making a pace count irrelevant. Individuals must continually count and maintain accountability of sensitive items, from weapons and ammunition to night vision devices. Indeed, this counting is paramount to any soldier looking to avoid non-judicial punishment and hence have any shot at a career.  Indeed, at the U.S. Army’s Ranger School, students tie each piece of equipment to themselves, so when they are tired, cold, or wet, they do not lose a key piece of equipment. It has been written, that losing equipment can have greater consequences than losing a war.

 Counting people lies at the heart of the NCO Corps. Accountability of teams, squads and platoons. While on patrol, squad leaders and platoon sergeants consistently conduct head counts to ensure nobody fell asleep next to a tree. In garrison, counting people ranges from head-counts in dining facilities, to knowing the number of people who used the on-base gym on any given day. We level entire forests to produce sign in sheets for the post gym and the personnel office.

While counting people at the tactical level is a general concern of NCOs, counting things is where officers come into play. Ask any company commander to expound on the percentage of their time spent on property book inventories, and you will learn quickly the stress that counting things places on military leadership. Officers hold additional duties such as Unit Status Report (USR) officer (normally reserved for the Battalion or Brigade Chemical Officer), where counting equipment, and the readiness of vehicles in the motor pool becomes a specialized skill.

With the advent of the Defense Travel System (DTS), every service member must strictly account for every penny spent while travelling. Fortunately, DTS is easy to navigate and not open to interpretation by approving officials at every

Looking to training, a leader’s report card often depends on the number of people they train. Power Point slides presented at Quarterly Training Briefs depict the number of soldiers who qualify expert on rifle, the number who passed and failed a PT test, the number who attended SHARP training. Often, these numbers sit beside a circle colored red, yellow, or green known as the gumball chart. Numbers as a measurement of success don’t stop in garrison, they translate to how we fight our wars.

Counting things is not some garrison phenomena, soldiers count many things in combat as well, usually days. The first 100 days in a combat zone are important to a tactical unit much like the first 100 days of a presidential administration. Soldiers count the 14 days they are allowed of leave, and of course the countdown to the day when they go home throughout a 365-day deployment.  In many cases, that countdown to the end begins the day they deploy. Indeed, software such as the famous “Donut of Misery” is a direct outgrowth of this phenomenon. Moreover, most soldiers learn to subtract one day from their time starting in basic training by adding the phrase “and a wake up,” as if that final day does not count.

The Donut of Misery, often added to a staff officer or NCO's desktop on Day 1 of a deployment

Throughout the campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan, the influence of numbers impacted nearly every commander’s update brief. Hours of electricity per day, number of wells dug, and the numbers of schools built quickly became the Global War on Terror’s version of body counts in Vietnam. The U.S. military spent thousands of man hours keeping track of the number of Iraqi Army soldier and policemen trained. Whatever that number added up to in 2011 was certainly less than the 800 or so ISIS fighters that rolled into Mosul.  Eight years of judging success by the number of security forces we manned, equipped, and trained didn’t amount to much. Indeed, according to a recent estimate the United States has killed over 50,000 ISIS fighters, which is nearly 30,000 more than the CIA’s estimated of the total number of ISIS members back in 2014. Fifty percent of the time, body counts work all the time.

Two recent and notable episodes of numbers and counting making the news was the 2003 invasion of Iraq, and the 2009 surge in Afghanistan. There was little debate in the scheme of maneuver, the tactics or strategy of either operation. Rather, the debate centered on the number of boots on the ground. General Shinseki, who recommended a force of 500k was rebuked by Secretary Rumsfeld who thought the mission could be accomplished by three or four guys. (That’s not the exact number Rumsfeld insisted upon, but I was not privy to his snowflakes). The debate on the right number continues to this day, although there is a camp of thinkers who would argue that the number of troops required for the invasion of Iraq was irrelevant. We invaded a nation halfway around the world and attempted to impose western democracy on a culture most Americans don’t understand.   

General McCrystal’s surge had three courses of action, and each was based on a specific number. Indeed, military planners often develop various courses of action as a “Heavy” “Medium” or “Light” option, all based on the numbers of troops they would require.  Bob Woodward’s book Obama’s Wars chronicled the infighting that occurred in deciding what course of action to choose. But, in limiting the courses of action to specific numbers, the paradigm of operational planning changed from distinct COAs to presenting a Range of Military Options, commonly known as the ROMO (no relation to the current second string Dallas Cowboys Quarterback).

At the strategic level, counting involves much larger numbers involving force structure. For example, one number that continually arises in political discussions is the number of ships the U.S. Navy requires. Numbers range from the current status over about 220, to those who believe the Navy should expand to well over 300 ships. For those keeping count, the U.S. Navy has 11 Carrier Strike Groups, while the rest of the world combined has zero. Adversaries such as Russia and China own aircraft operate carriers with ramps, similar to those kids use with skateboards. The 11-0 shutout in Carrier Strike Groups helps me sleep at night.

On the land domain, the Army has been fighting for the right number of troops in the current era of downsizing the force. Indeed, the wartime high back in 2007 was an Army of 570k, which is on its way down to 450k. Lower numbers means lower percentage of promotion rates, which back in 2007 hovered at nearly 98%, allowing for officers with DUIs on their record to advance in rank. The percentage now teeters between 50-70%, and good people don’t make the cut. It’s a cruel reality, and makes for a good debate on Tom Ricks’s blog.

Other key way to count thing at the strategic level are the “ways” and “means.”  One of the major contributions that Washington, D.C. makes is funding things. The almighty dollar still reigns supreme. And the bigger the problem, the more money that flows its way. Arguably, inside the beltway strategy is what gets funded, and any plan or program without dollars associated with it is more a fantasy than reality. The recent Washington Post article on the Pentagon’s $125 billion in possible savings, and the Navy’s Fat Leonard corruption scandal highlight how influential money can be.   

Conclusion

Those looking to enter and serve in the United States Military should know and understand the value of math (don’t worry, little to no algebra though). We spend countless hours trying to find accurate numbers to display a measure of success in our operations. But when you read the history of Vietnam, of how small numbers of insurgents paralyzed the strategic decision making of the United States, or how the large Soviet Army failed to defeat an even smaller opponent, you realize two things. With humans at the center of warfare, Clausewitz was right when he described warfare as uncertain. Second, warfare being uncertain and defined by fog, friction, and chance; sometimes numbers don’t mean a damn thing.

War is not and will never be a wholly quantitative phenomena.  Although quantity has a quality all of its own, mass, money, and numbers are not everything.  When the budget cuts come, the force size is reduced, or the body counts start to rise, the numbers can be overwhelming, confusing, and could tempt one to dive deep into minutiae.  At these times, there is one and only one question the strategic thinker should ask themselves about the numbers…that question is “so what?”