Book Review
Forging the Sword; Doctrinal Change in the U.S. Army
By Benjamin M. Jensen
Military innovation is not limited to new technologies or other material developments. A key aspect of maintaining overmatch against America’s enemies and adversaries is the development of new methods of force employment, or the doctrine by which men and women fight the nation’s wars. In Forging the Sword, by Benjamin M. Jensen, the author reviews the changes in the U.S. Army’s fighting doctrine since 1976. Jensen’s conducts a deep dive into the origins of the U.S. Army’s Active Defense, AirLand Battle, Full-Dimensional Operations, and Full-Spectrum Operations doctrines between 1973 and 2008.
Jensen’s tale of continued change in the U.S. Army’s core fighting doctrine paints a picture of an organization dedicated to innovation. Jensen breaks the myth of the U.S. Army as a behemoth resistant to change. Indeed, the author provides detail of how key strategic level leaders such as Generals DePuy, Starry, Sullivan, and Wallace used their positions to enable innovation. Further, Forging the Sword describes the continual necessity for doctrinal innovation at each stage, informing the reader that the military does not change for the sake of change.
More than a review of doctrine change, Jensen provides lessons to the reader on the conditions required to drive service and joint force innovation. His observations include incubators, or informal organizations outside an organization’s hierarchy. Further, Jensen describes how innovation often comes from informal networks where participants can express new thoughts and ideas without fear of retribution or retaliation. These insights come from the premise that large glacial moving organizations can stifle innovative voices. Within a bureaucracy as large as the Department of Defense, processes, including acquisition law, DOD regulations, and service parochialism, hinder the responsive development and fielding of new capabilities.
The current paradigm of change in the joint force is the writing of joint and service concepts that precede capabilities development. These capabilities range from new combat platforms to changes in force design and changes in doctrine. Jensen provides a history on how formal concepts came into being in the early 1990s with the publication of the U.S. Army’s 525-5 pamphlet series. Today, concepts such as the Chairman’s Capstone Concept for Joint Operations (CCJO) serve as a foundation and a vision for the future force.
When innovations are approved, Jensen describes the necessity of advocacy to inform broader audiences of the new ideas. This translates to a strategic communication or rollout campaign. For example, following the publication of the Army’s counter insurgency manual (FM 3-24) in late 2006 leaders spoke about and advocated the document in a variety of forums ranging from the service’s war colleges to an appearance by one of the lead authors on The Daily Show. Other senior leaders published essays in professional journals describing the doctrine and how it would change the way the military was conducting its counterinsurgency campaigns.
The ability for new and creative ideas requires military organizations to develop and implement methods to receive new ideas from the lowest to highest level. A second aspect of advocacy Jensen examines is the use of professional publications. Jensen successfully argues that innovators can inform professional audiences of their ideas by writing and publishing their thoughts. Further, the process of professional writing and publishing allows new ideas to mature, as other innovators challenge and improve upon concepts floated in various publications.
Jensen concludes his book with recommendations on how the military can continue to embrace innovation. These recommendations include providing incentives for leaders to write and publish in professional military journals, preserving small organizations dedicated to research in times of tight budgets, and maintaining robust training and education institutions. Jensen stresses that unlike major combat platforms such as fighter jets, aircraft carriers, and tanks, the militaries education institutions do not rank high in priority when budgets shrink. Moreover, military education rarely has a constituency represented in legislative bodies.
The only shortcoming of the book is Jensen does not examine roadblocks or factors that can prevent innovation. Indeed, scholarship on innovation has teased out some elements such as attachments to flawed ideas, or leaders simply demanding innovation from their subordinates. Creating an innovation division on a staff doesn’t necessarily lead to more or greater innovation within a command.
Forging the Sword is not a history book of U.S. Army doctrine. Rather, the book is a foundational text on what is takes to innovate and change military organizations. It is important not just for soldiers, but for leaders across the joint force to recognize the continual need to develop, test, and implement new ideas of fighting if the U.S. is to maintain competitive advantage in combat. For military professionals working in joint and service institutional assignments with the responsibility for concept and doctrine development, Forging the Sword will serve as an effective primer for those looking to lead change at any level.